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Wil Wilkinson notes that happiness cannot be taken as the sole master value and pleas for a 
“reasonable pluralism" in which happiness competes with other values in the public 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/archives/april-2007/debate. I agree that happiness is not the 
only valuable thing, but I also think that happiness has additional merits that go beyond its 
intrinsic worth. One extra point in favor of happiness is that it matches other humanistic 
values quite well. A second bonus is that happiness is an indicator of the fit between living 
conditions and human nature and, as such, informs us about the practicability of various 
value mixes. 
Pluralists look for policies that produce an optimal mix of the various values they endorse. As 
a result they must consider how well these values match each other when put into practice, 
and will give priority to values that appear to fit well with others. This requires some insight 
into synergies and conflicts between values. For years, moral philosophers have tried to gain 
this kind of insight with mere armchair theorizing, and have typically focused on possible 
conflicts. In the case of happiness, this kind of theorizing has produced dire scenarios such 
as Brave New World, which suggest that the pursuit on happiness will violate principles of 
freedom and human dignity. But now, empirical happiness research allows us to look at 
actual conflicts and synergies between values, and this creates a different picture.  
The available data provide little evidence of conflicts between happiness and other values, 
but instead show synergies between happiness and the values typically endorsed in 
contemporary Western nations. People live happiest in societies where humanistic values 
are put into practice, that is, in societies where human rights are respected, the political 
system is democratic, the educational system fosters independence, and where a decent 
material standard of living is enjoyed. So, the means for furthering happiness are typically 
things we value in themselves as well. Moreover, happiness is also instrumental to several of 
these values. For instance, happy people appear to be more likely to live up to humanistic 
values than unhappy people: they are not only more autonomous but also more social and 
creative.  
This is not to say that happiness fits well with all values. For instance, people appear to be 
less happy in societies where collectivistic values, such as submission to authority and 
identification with a clan, are endorsed. The main reason seems to be that humans have an 
innate preference for a fair degree of independence. [1]  
This brings me to the wider point that happiness is a sign of human thriving. In most 
biological organisms, flourishing is manifest only in physical health and survival, but in higher 
animals it is also manifest in affective experience. In humans, that affective experience is 
reflected in happiness. As such, happiness carries important information for a moral pluralist. 
It tells us whether a chosen value mix is workable or not. If people live long and happy lives 
in a country, then the value mix is apparently viable there. If not, the mix must be failing to 
meet the objective demands of human nature in some way and must therefore be 
reconsidered.  
For these reasons happiness deserves a prominent role in the theater of value pluralism.  
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